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U.S. Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction 
Panel Discussion∗
MENZIES: I would like to begin by introducing the panel starting 
at the far end.  First is Kristen Boon, known to many of you; she is a 
professor at the law school who specializes in international law and 
publishes in that area.  Her J.D. is from New York University; her 
LL.M. is from Columbia.  She has clerked in the Canadian Supreme 
Court, and she has been my partner in fighting for this day, and glad 
to have you here. 
John Herbst.  Ambassador John Herbst is, as you already know, 
the Coordinator for the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization.  
He has served as Ambassador to Ukraine and Ambassador to Uzbeki-
stan.  Those I highlight because you need to know that he has re-
ceived this government’s highest awards for his work in those areas.  
He received a Presidential Distinguished Service Award for his work 
in Ukraine, where he and his staff prevented the theft of an election 
and preserved democracy for the people of that region.  He received 
the State Department’s Distinguished Honor Award for his efforts to 
facilitate the supply of our forces and the protection of our forces in 
the Middle East, by creating an American Air Base, and supplies en-
tering there.  And so, John brings to his work a Bachelor of Science 
in Foreign Service from Georgetown University, where he was Phi 
Beta Kappa, and a Master of Law and Diplomacy, with Distinction, 
from the Fletcher School.  We are delighted to have you here, John, 
and thank you for coming. 
Ambassador James Dobbins currently works for the RAND Cor-
poration, where he is the Director of the International Security and 
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Defense Policy Center.  He has broad experience.  He has served as 
Assistant Secretary of State for Europe, as a Special Assistant to the 
President for the Western Hemisphere, Special Advisor to the Presi-
dent and Secretary of State for the Balkans, and Ambassador to the 
European Community.  He was assigned, during the Clinton admini-
stration, almost all of the top issues that came up on the radar screen 
in international affairs—Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo.  He was the 
Bush administration’s first Special Envoy for Afghanistan, and he also 
was the representative to the Afghan opposition in the wake of Sep-
tember 11, 2001.  Also, he was my boss in the Foreign Service and is 
one of the best people I have ever worked for.  And thank you, Jim, 
for coming today.  Many of you have read his book Beginners Guide to 
Nation Building and the two other members of that series.  So Jim, 
thank you. 
The third is Daniel Serwer, who is Vice President of the Center 
for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations and the Centers of 
Innovation at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP).  That does 
not tell you all about Daniel.  He has worked in the areas of Afghani-
stan, the Balkans, Haiti, Iraq, and Sudan while at the Institute of 
Peace.  He is a former Foreign Service Officer.  He did terrific work 
in Bosnia as the person that held the federation together—the fed-
eration of Serbs, Bosnians, and Croats—during the most critical pe-
riod of peacebuilding in the area.  Daniel is single-handedly respon-
sible for taking the United States Institute of Peace from being a 
think tank to a do tank—an operational unit.  For those of you who 
do not know the U.S. Institute of Peace, it was funded by the U.S. 
government but basically kept at arms length and rigorously inde-
pendent.  Daniel has made it into a player in providing support to 
countless international crises.  So, I am delighted to have you here 
too. 
With that introduction, I am going to start by asking a question, 
and that is how we are going to do this.  We will open it to the floor in 
a few minutes, but I am going to take the chair and ask Ambassador 
Herbst what is new on the horizon, in terms of the U.S. response to 
post-conflict reconstruction. 
HERBST: Thank you.  S/CRS1 really has two major imperatives.  
First, they ensure that the U.S. government is organized in a unified 
way to handle stabilization or reconstruction crises, to make sure the 
next time we have such a crisis that all elements of U.S. power are 
used to address it, that there is a single comprehensive plan which 
 1 Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. 
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uses all elements of that power, and that it is implemented effectively 
and efficiently. 
The second part of our mission is to make sure we have all the 
trained civilians with the right skill sets, the right equipment, ready to 
go in such a crisis.  And here is where we are in achieving those ob-
jectives this morning. 
There has been an agreement in the InterAgency regarding the 
creation of what we call the InterAgency Management System for re-
sponding to a stabilization crisis.  The InterAgency Management Sys-
tem has the following elements. 
First, you have a policy level group at the Assistant Secretary 
Level; it is called the Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group 
(CRSG).  It consists of every agency which has a role in a crisis.  It is 
chaired by a combination of the Regional Secretary and Senior Re-
gional National Director of the NSC2 and the head of S/CRS.  I am 
glad of the fact that you have three chairpeople consolidating  
strength; it is a bureaucratic compromise.  By stepping into a real cri-
sis, senior leaders of our government choose to take charge, and the 
S/CRS will have someone to run the policies and make sure that the 
trainings are on time. 
Under the CRSG is something called the Secretariat, run by my 
office.  It is InterAgency; it is designed to write a plan of operations 
for the U.S. government on the civilian side in a stabilization crisis.  
Equally important, it has Pentagon participation to ensure that mili-
tary and civilian plans are completely in harmony. 
To further ensure such harmony, if there is a stabilization crisis 
where there is a military component, we have something called Inte-
gration Planning Cell.  This Integration Planning Cell is run by the 
S/CRS; it is also an InterAgency group.  It will deploy to the head-
quarters of the military that is running the operation.  If this is a U.S.-
run military operation, it will deploy to the relevant Combatant 
Command.  At the intervention as to the operations in the Middle 
East, it would deploy to CENTCOM3; if it is Latin America, it would 
deploy to SOUTHCOM.4  If it is an international military operation—
for example, the U.N.—this outfit would deploy to wherever the U.N. 
military headquarters are.  The purpose here is to make sure at the 
field level that military and civilian plans are completely in sync. 
 2 United States National Security Council. 
 3 United States Central Command. 
 4 United States Southern Command. 
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Finally, the InterAgency Management System has something 
called Advance Civilian Teams.  These are our equivalent of PRTs.5  
These are an InterAgency group.  They would be under S/CRS lead-
ership in most cases.  If they deploy to a country where there is a U.S. 
embassy, it would be under the Chief of Mission; if not, it would be 
the senior U.S. civilian component to the country. 
Their job is to run all civilian operations or all U.S. civilian op-
erations in such a crisis.  If it is a country which is large and which has 
many, many requirements, there would be field Advance Civilian 
Teams operated by the country under the leadership of the Advance 
Civilian Team headquarters.  This Advance Civilian Team, as de-
signed, can work in an operation where the U.S. is the principal 
power, and it can work in a multi-lateral setting with other countries.  
It could work in a sector where the U.N. has the leadership.  It is de-
signed to function in all kinds of international settings.  This is the 
agreed [manner in which we now proceed] in a crisis . 
The second part of our mission is to make sure that we have the 
civilians ready to go out to such crises.  We have devised, and it has 
been approved by our government, a three-pool system of civilian 
employees.  The employees we are looking for need to have the skills 
required when there is no functioning government.  So we are look-
ing for people, for these pools to be comprised of people, who have 
the following sets of skills. There will be all types of engineering—
road engineers, civil engineers, water and electrical engineers.  There 
will be people who can handle public administration—public health 
officials, city planners.  All the people involved in rule of law, mean-
ing police, judges, corrections officials, attorneys, and also the econo-
mists.  In some instances, there might be port operators.  All the 
people that we need to stand up a government which does not exist 
or to help any number of functions for a government that does not 
perform very well. 
We have agreed to meet three different pools in which we will 
find people with these skills.  The first pool is something we call the 
active response pool.  These are people whose full-time job it will be 
to deploy to countries in crisis.  They will work for the federal gov-
ernment, State Department, USAID,6 and other federal agencies. 
Right now, the U.S. government has a ten-person capability, 
which is a tiny, tiny capability, which sits in my office.  But there has 
 5 Provincial Reconstruction Teams. 
 6 United States Agency for International Development. 
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been legislation proposed by Senators [Richard] Lugar7 and [Joe] 
Biden8 which would call for an advance response pool of 250 of 
whom roughly forty percent would be the State Department, forty 
percent would be USAID, and twenty percent sitting around the In-
terAgency.  These folks would be trained and equipped to deploy 
within forty-eight hours of the decision.  They would be truly a rapid 
response force for civilian needs. 
The second pool of people is what we call the stand-by response 
pool.  The same legislation under Lugar-Biden calls for a stand-by re-
sponse pool of 2000 people.  They would also sit throughout the Fed-
eral InterAgency.  They would sit, again, forty percent at State, forty 
percent at the USAID, and twenty percent elsewhere.  These folks 
would have full-time day jobs.  They would deploy in a crisis.  They 
would train for two or three weeks a year.  It would take about forty-
five to sixty days to get them out to the field.  We feel we could have 
eighty percent of our active response corps deployed at any one time.  
We could have anywhere from ten to twenty-five percent of the stand-
by corps deployed at any one time. 
The third component of this civilian response capability is a civil-
ian reserve corps.  President Bush mentioned this during his State of 
the Union speech in January.9  This corps would function much like 
our military reserve system.  People in civilian life, and state and local 
government, would sign up.  They would sign up for a four-year pe-
riod.  Like our stand-by corps, they would train for two or three weeks 
a year.  They would have a commitment within their four-year period 
of service to deploy for up to one year.  We feel we would be able to 
deploy twenty-five percent of them at any given time and it would 
take about two months to get them out into the field. 
My office, right now, is working on creating, as soon as possible, 
a 500-person civilian reserve corps.  We received appropriations in 
May [2007] to create such a corps.  Unfortunately, we do not have au-
thorized legislation yet passed which enables us to actually use this 
plan. 
The Lugar-Biden legislation which I referred to is right now in 
consideration in the Senate.  There is a similar bill proposed by Con-
gressman [Samuel S.] Farr10 which is under consideration in the 
 7 Senior Senator from Indiana (Republican). 
 8 Senior Senator from Delaware (Democrat). 
 9 George W. Bush, President of the U.S., State of the Union Address (June 23, 
2007), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070123-
2.html. 
 10 U.S. House of Representatives, California, Democrat. 
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House.  It will take us approximately one year from the passage of 
that legislation to create this 500-person civilian reserve corps. 
We see this as a prototype for a larger corps to be created.  If you 
were to create a civilian reserve corps of 2000, and couple that with 
an active response corps of 250, and a stand-by response corps of 
2000, we would be able to deploy about 1200 civilians overseas within 
sixty minutes, within sixty days of a decision. 
(Audience Laughter) 
A couple of other points.  This capability is absolutely essential; 
this is understood.  The U.S. government is going to have this capa-
bility at some point in the near future, and this capability can be used 
both by ourselves alone and in multi-lateral settings.  S/CRS has ex-
cellent relations with our counterpart offices elsewhere around the 
world, and Clint was right to say that the U.S. government’s capability 
is not the first internationally,11 the greater capability probably be-
longs to our Canadian friends in the START office.  They have a sig-
nificant budget.  They have the ability to put people in the field in 
large numbers which we do not have today.  But if we establish the 
capabilities I have described, we will certainly launch to the forefront.  
We have excellent cooperation with our friends in the E.U. and the 
U.N.  I have worked closely with Carolyn MacAskie,12 who I will speak 
with later this afternoon.  This truly is the wave of the future. 
MENZIES: Thank you very much.  I should mention, too, that is a 
very good thing that you have mentioned, to hear of the develop-
ments and about the reserve.  But I wanted to mention also that 
Daniel could almost get the award for “I told you so” for having—how 
should I put this—warned early and often that our efforts in Iraq 
were not adequately planned.  Dan, where do you see the failures and 
how do you think the new approaches we are taking respond to that? 
SERWER: I was not planning to start with Iraq, but I am just back 
from Baghdad and Kabul and I can say a few words about Iraq.  You 
know, frankly, Iraq was done by a pick-up team—a pick-up team, 
which had no idea of the depths of the problems that we faced.  And 
my colleagues and I have taken a close look at what went wrong in 
Iraq in a chapter in a book that I assume will be published this fall. 
To give you the bottom line, what happened was they under-
mined their own plan basically.  Their plan was decapitation—use the 
existing structures to govern Iraq with a new leadership.  When the 
ministries were looted, that plan went by the wayside.  You no longer 
 11 Clint Williamson, Keynote Address, 38 Seton Hall L. Rev 1255 (2008). 
 12 Carolyn MacAskie works for the U.N. Peacebuilding Commission. 
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had in Iraq the institutional setup to run a decapitated and bleeding 
government.  And I actually believe that almost all the serious errors 
were made within a month or two months of victory and that we have 
played catch-up ever since, sometimes with enormous courage, some-
times with enormous results, not always, but still playing catch-up, 
and we have not caught up because the situation has largely spiraled 
out of control. 
I just got back.  I was in Baghdad recently at a reconciliation 
conference for a community called Mahmoudiyah; it is a community 
you know as the Triangle of Death on the Southern end of Baghdad.  
It was a reconciliation conference for tribal sheikhs, and they, both 
Sunni and Shia, very much wanted to begin to view the issues that 
could stabilize their community, and that has been made possible by 
a much better security situation. 
I do not share the view of those who say that nothing has 
changed.  I was in Baghdad for five days.  I think I heard two detona-
tions in five days, when you heard two detonations an hour at some 
points in Baghdad.  Certainly the situation has improved. 
But can the Iraqis hold the situation we have created?  I think 
the answer for that question is no one believes that they can.  In addi-
tion, I hasten to add that the Iraqis who came to help us in Baghdad 
through Tikrit, most of them reported that the situation with those 
places is not secure in any part because of the lack of American mili-
tary presence.  So it is a very mixed picture, certainly not uniformly 
deteriorating, as the Iraq Study Group said almost a year ago.  I was 
Executive Director in the Iraq Study Group’s report after, and we cer-
tainly thought at that time—December of last year [2006]—that there 
was a marked deterioration in the situation.  I would not say that 
right now on all fronts, but I also would not say that I see much possi-
bility for anything that even remotely resembles the goals set out in 
the administration’s paper on victory. 
John, I am wondering if I could add a word or two to what John 
said, because I think John talked about two absolutely essential com-
ponents of the future of how we approach these operations: inter-
agency coordination and the civilian reserve.  Our institute, which 
did help to conceive of the civilian reserve, is now working on two 
other things that I know are also very close to John’s heart, and I 
wanted to mention it here. 
One is the issue of developing doctrine.  You cannot just have a 
group of civilians who know how to fix water systems know how to run 
a local government.  You have to have them working within a strate-
gic framework that they all understand in advance and that the mili-
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tary folks also understand in advance.  And it is my belief that that 
common framework should be more or less constant from operation 
to operation, and if it is done at a sufficient level of generality, that 
can happen. 
So with John’s—what shall I say—blessing, USIP and the Peace-
keeping and Stability Operations Institute of the U.S. Army, from 
which there are a number of people in the room, we are working to-
gether with a lot of NGOs,13 with a lot of other organizations, trying 
to develop a draft doctrine that would be the bedrock on which the 
civilian reserve would sit in a certain sense. 
If you develop doctrine, you have to train, as well; you have to 
train whether you have doctrine or not.  At the moment, there are 
many different ideas about training.  Our institute is forging ahead 
with the development of an education training center, sometimes 
known as The Peace Academy, that will sit at the new headquarters of 
USIP almost across the street from the State Department on the Mall 
at 23rd [Street] and Constitution [Avenue].  And the unique thing, I 
think, about the USIP’s training capability is that we have the capabil-
ity to train military, civilians, and NGOs in the same place, and I 
think that is, outside the academic world, in government, here in the 
government world, there are actually very few other institutions that 
can do that kind of training. 
And I think, if you do not want to see more Iraqs, these are some 
of the essential elements: interagency coordination that John talked 
about, the civilian reserve, a professional civilian reserve that has doc-
trine and is well-trained and well-trained in a way that is joint.  And by 
joint, I do not mean only civilian and military, but also NGOs and 
schools. 
MENZIES: Thank you Daniel.  Jim, you have been the author of, I 
think, one of the most successful post-conflict reconstructions, but 
also you played an absolutely critical role in what was initially not a 
military intervention role, or at least not a military formal interven-
tion in Afghanistan.  What do you think are the deficits in what we 
are doing?  What should we be doing differently?  How does it effect 
the neighborhood. 
DOBBINS: Thank you, John.  I think both Clint Williamson and 
John Herbst do deserve a lot of credit for turning around an admini-
stration that was initially disinclined to get seriously engaged in post-
conflict reconstruction and nation-building, but I am a little worried 
about the durability of the changes that they have been able to intro-
 13 Nongovernmental organizations. 
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duce because when administrations change, a lot of good things, as 
well as some bad things, can get thrown overboard.  And if you re-
member back, looking at the American occupation of Iraq, you might 
think that this was the first time we had ever done something like 
this.  It was one unanticipated challenge after another; it was one im-
provised response after another. 
In fact, of course, it was not the first time that we had done 
something like this.  In fact, it was the seventh time in a little more 
than a decade that the United States had liberated a society and then 
tried to rebuild it.  In 1991, we had gone into Kuwait.  We then went 
into Somalia, and to Haiti, and to Bosnia, and to Kosovo, and to Af-
ghanistan, and finally, into Iraq.  And of those seven societies, six are 
Muslim.  The only one of them that is not Muslim is Haiti.  So, when 
the American Army went into Iraq in 2003, there was no army in the 
world with more experience in nation-building than the American.  
And incidentally, there was no Western army in the world with more 
experience operating within a Muslim society than the American 
Army.  So you have to ask how we could do this so often and yet do it 
so badly. 
And the lesson, and the reason goes back to the controversies 
that surrounded the whole nation-building paradigm in the 1990s 
that tended to discredit this form of behavior, even as it was begin-
ning to bear considerable success.  The pace of these kinds of mis-
sions grew very substantially after the end of the Cold War.  During 
the Cold War, the United States invaded a new country about once 
every ten years, so you had Grenada, Dominican Republic, Lebanon, 
[and] Panama.  In the ‘90s, that went up from once every ten years to 
once every two years, and the duration of these missions was much 
longer. 
The U.N.’s record went even more quickly.  During the Cold 
War, the U.N. launched a new peacekeeping operation on the aver-
age of about once every four years.  Since 1989, the U.N. launches a 
new peacekeeping operation every six months.  And these missions 
are now lasting eight to ten years.  So, if you are doing one every two 
years, pretty soon you are doing three or four at the same time as the 
United States has done.  If you are doing one every six months, you 
are doing two dozen at the same time, which is where the U.N. is at 
the moment. 
And these are expensive, and they are intensive, manpower-
intensive, and the U.S. Congress and the American public were get-
ting fed up with this in the 1990s.  It was a new burden.  We paid 
twenty-five percent of all the U.N.’s costs and, of course, one-hundred 
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percent of our own, and, at least in the early years, it did not look like 
a particularly useful form of activity.  You know, in the popular mind, 
it is the failures that linger.  For every one person who can remember 
what the U.N. did in Cambodia or Namibia or El Salvador, there are 
a hundred who remember Rwanda or Srebrenica or have watched 
Blackhawk Down.  And so these were the impressions that were formed 
and, as a result, when the new administration came in in 2001, they 
had pledged they were not going to do nation-building, and they 
were determined, when stuck with it, to do it very differently.  And es-
sentially, it fell overboard, everything that we had learned in the pre-
ceding decade. 
And we had learned a good deal in the preceding decade.  Both 
the U.N. and the U.S. slowly got better at these operations.  If you 
look at the progression of the United States from Somalia to Haiti to 
Bosnia and Kosovo, you find each of them was better prepared, more 
professionally managed, and had a smoother transition than the ones 
that preceded it.  And the U.N. had a similar improvement in its suc-
cess rate.  But this was tossed overboard, first in Afghanistan and then 
particularly in Iraq, where we tried a sort of a nation-building on the 
cheap approach, as if the lessons that we learned in the ‘90s could be 
ignored, and those lessons were important. 
They were, first of all, that there is a big relationship between 
input and output, that military manpower and economic assistance 
are key variables for producing security and economic growth.  And if 
you put in low levels of military manpower and economic assistance, 
what you get are low levels of security and economic growth.  This was 
a lesson that escaped the administration in its early years. 
Similarly, the role of neighboring states.  If the neighbors do not 
want you to put a broken society back together again, you are not go-
ing to succeed because they simply have too much access and too 
much influence, and too much at stake to stand aside.  They are go-
ing to interfere and they are often going to interfere in quite unhelp-
ful ways. 
So I think that it is to be applauded that the administration has 
embraced this paradigm.  They do not call it nation-building; they 
call it stabilization or reconstruction, but they essentially mean the 
same thing, and [the administration has] begun to take it more seri-
ously.  I am concerned, however, if the administration’s reaction to 
the initial failures in Iraq is we have to do better next time.  It is not 
clear that that is the American people’s reaction.  The American 
people’s reaction may well be we better not do this again next time, a 
sort of post–Viet Nam phenomenon, where we forgot everything we 
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knew about counterinsurgency and went back to defending the Fulda 
Gap, and the result was that we spent five years in Iraq relearning 
those lessons very painfully.  And it was not until General Patraeus 
was assigned that traditional approaches to counterinsurgency that 
had been worked out through dozens of different experiences by the 
United States and other nations were finally applied and have begun 
to have some modicum of success. 
So I am concerned that we may go through another one of these 
rejections, and I just hope that the American people can somehow 
retain two conclusions at the same time.  Yes, sure, do not invade 
large hostile Middle Eastern countries on the basis of flawed intelli-
gence from a very narrow and unrepresentative coalition.  Okay, that 
is a good lesson.  But if Iraq was a war of choice and the choice is a 
poor one, Afghanistan rightfully was, and both of them left us with 
heavy burdens for reconstruction and stabilization.  And we are going 
to find that, while we do not have to engage in every one of these 
missions that appears on the horizon, we are going to be engaged in 
some of them, and we are going to really have to learn a lot better. 
So I hope that Iraq does not color the American perceptions of 
this activity in an irremediable way because it is important to recog-
nize that, despite the occasional failures, and sometimes quite spec-
tacular failures, there are tens of millions of people around the world 
who are living today at peace, and in most cases under freely elected 
governments, because American troops or NATO troops or European 
troops or U.N. troops went in and separated the combatants, dis-
armed the contending factions, oversaw a process of holding elec-
tions, and then stayed around long enough to ensure that those gov-
ernments could take hold. 
And so it is, in places like Mozambique and Cambodia and El 
Salvador and Namibia and Sierra Leone and Liberia and East Timor 
and Albania and Macedonia and Bosnia and Kosovo, that, as I said, 
people are living in peace, and in almost all those cases under freely 
elected governments, because the international community, in one 
guise or another, conducted those kinds of operations.  And it is go-
ing to be very important that we continue to develop our capabilities 
and that the kinds of changes that Clint and John have succeeded in 
introducing endure and are taken up by succeeding administrations. 
MENZIES: Kris? 
BOON: Just a quick question.  The terrorist threat has become a 
very apparent issue on the ground for Americans involved abroad, 
and I am wondering how this is being contained in terms of current 
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post-conflict reconstruction and whether this is influencing American 
policy generally on post-conflict reconstruction. 
SERWER: Well it is having a dramatic effect on capabilities in Iraq 
and in Afghanistan.  In Iraq none of us traveled outside the Interna-
tional Zone without shooters and armored cars.  It is not a great way 
to do business.  There are a lot of courageous people though—and 
this is invisible to the American public—but there are several hun-
dred very courageous advisors to ministries in Iraq, and they work 
quite frequently in Iraqi ministries, including the Interior Ministry, 
and it is just a downright dangerous thing to do, and we owe a great 
debt to those people who are doing it. 
But our capabilities are severely limited in Iraq because of the 
security situation.  In Afghanistan, I think we are in a very anomalous 
situation.  I walked on the street in Kabul, freely without body armor, 
without armored cars, without shooters, and I felt perfectly safe.  In 
fact, there is very little record of Western civilians being attacked in 
Afghanistan in recent years, and it really is quite safe—remarkably so. 
Nevertheless, the embassy, all the aid contractors are under se-
vere security restrictions that are likely to continue, if I understood 
what the Ambassador told me when I called him.  And that is a real 
problem because Afghanistan is, in many ways, more hopeful than 
Iraq, and if we are not able to bring all of our tools there—and I 
might add the U.N. is quite restricted in their movements in Afghani-
stan as well, so I think it is having a dramatically negative impact in 
both Iraq and Afghanistan. 
HERBST: There is another element to this too.  When you put 
people out in the field or, in my office, we would plant the people in 
the field, security is an important consideration.  Our folks are being 
taught in going into dangerous environments, environments where 
traditionally the State Department does not put people.  But by the 
same token, we have to provide a subsystem for them, and what that 
means is that we plan operations, we plan a budget for operations.  
And that drives the cost considerably, and that is also dangerous. 
MENZIES: I would like to open the floor to our audience, particu-
larly our students for some questions.  We have a few minutes left and 
I would like to take full advantage of it.  We have microphones or if 
they can just shout out a question and we will repeat it for everybody.  
Do I see hands?  Yes. 
AUDIENCE SPEAKER: Hi.  I am not a student.  My name is Jenna 
Slotin, and I am from the International Peace Academy.  I decided to 
come to New Jersey from my office in Midtown.  I thank you for your 
presentation today. 
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One question I have is that, you touched on training and doc-
trine with respect to a civilian reserve corps, and certainly, getting 
trained professionals in place is critical for the person who is picked.  
But I think a very important and a close second is that those individu-
als are not only trained to set up the judiciary, the correction system, 
public administration, but trained to transfer those skills to local offi-
cials.  And I think we have seen in the field of development, and now 
post-conflict reconstruction, capacity building is not done well, and 
the transfer of those skills is a serious challenge.  But that is what is 
going to prevent us from needing to go back five years down the 
road; setting up an effective and capable state is of primary impor-
tance. 
And so, I wonder if you are taking measures to integrate into the 
work training for a civilian reserve corps [with] training capacity for 
local officials. 
HERBST: Right now, we do not have a civilian reserve corps.  We 
are doing planning to provide training for them.  You can be sure 
that what we have in mind is capacity transfer.  We do not want to be 
in any specific country any longer than we have to.  So the purpose is 
to put people on the ground who are able to oversee the provision of 
services, one, and two, to make sure that they train local people or 
find the right local people who continue that provision of services so 
they can leave. 
SERWER: And maybe I can add just a word.  That is one of our 
projected courses is in fact on the military and transferring the capa-
bility, but I recently had to re-do it as well, already.  I mentioned our 
Reconciliation Conference from Mahmoudiyah; it was actually con-
ducted by a set of Iraqi facilitators who we trained a couple of years 
before.  I was there to make sure things kept on track and had a role 
to play, especially in preparing some of the statements.  The actual 
activity was conducted by Iraqis who were conducting such activities 
in their own communities day by day. 
WILLIAMSON: If I could just point out one other point.  Just from 
a practical point of view, having done this in Kosovo and again in 
Iraq, there is always a tension between two objectives. 
In Kosovo there was a big concern because there was a lack of 
stability there and that rule of law was not succeeding.  So when I 
went in after two years of the mission being off the ground, I had a 
very strong mandate to go in and have a more robust interventionist 
policy, using international judges and prosecutors, where we were ac-
tually taking away some of the responsibilities that had already 
evolved to locals. 
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And so you had competing pressures.  I had people from the de-
velopment side saying, you have got to do more in terms of capacity 
building.  Every time we would start down that road, you would get 
the competing pressure from NATO countries saying, you have got to 
do more about crime so that we can get our troops out here.  And 
this is a dynamic that goes on in every one of these settings, and while 
it is easy to talk about doing capacity building, you are always going to 
come up against this hurdle as you try to implement it. 
